Malaysia's BRICS Bid: Not Aligning Away from Non-Alignment ...

On 29 July, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim disclosed that Malaysia had applied to join BRICS. There are concerns that Malaysia’s move to join the multilateral entity marks a shift from its long-standing non-alignment policy towards closer ties with China and Russia, and away from the US-led Western camp. However, this view misunderstands the domestic politics of Malaysia and Putrajaya’s efforts to diversify its partnerships.

Founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, BRICS seeks to expand foreign investment and economic cooperation. This year, the grouping welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates as new members.

Despite its decision, Malaysia still actively engages with Western-led initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the formerly US-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It also maintains close military ties with the US, including frequent arms purchases, joint exercises and training programmes. China remains Malaysia’s biggest trading partner, taking up 17.1 per cent of its total trade in 2023. But the US continues to be its second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) behind the EU.

Anwar’s decision to join BRICS should not be viewed as Malaysia opposing the US. Despite the grouping being seen as an anti-Western bloc, Malaysia’s foreign policy remains non-aligned, a stance which dates back to the 1970s when it joined the Non-Alignment Movement and established diplomatic relations with China. This distinction is crucial for policymakers on both sides of the great-power rivalry.

There are three reasons why Malaysia intends to join BRICS. All three are congruent with its national interests. First, domestic politics are of prime importance. The Malaysian public has been demonstrably vocal about its discontent about the US and the West’s positions on Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. The matter has damaged the image of the US drastically among Malaysians, particularly among its Muslim majority. Within BRICS, China and South Africa have been making notable efforts to push for peace in Gaza. South Africa’s case against Israel for genocide has been welcomed by Malaysia and is seen favourably by the Malaysian public.

Anwar’s decision to join BRICS should not be viewed as opposing the US in great-power competition. Despite the grouping being seen as an anti-Western bloc and Russia, Malaysia’s foreign policy remains non-aligned.

Aware of this discontent, Anwar recognises that joining BRICS can serve as a way to signal to the domestic audience that the government is addressing its concerns about US leadership. At the same time, he is careful not to sever any substantive ties with the US, which remains a stable and traditional military partner for Malaysia and a major contributor to its economy. Therefore, while Anwar is mindful of potential misunderstandings from the outside world regarding Malaysia’s decision, he can leverage perceptions of aligning with BRICS to gain legitimacy at home without breaking essential ties with the US.

Second, BRICS can enable Malaysia to play a bigger role internationally. BRICS+ countries are estimated to account for 37.3 per cent of global GDP. Joining the group means seeking more institutionalised cooperation with rising powers. For instance, as India’s global influence is set to grow, BRICS can help Malaysia foster a tighter relationship with India, particularly in cybersecurity. The grouping can also help Malaysia’s semiconductor industry to move up the value chain. With Anwar’s recent visit to India to deepen ties in investment and defence, it is clear that Malaysia does not intend to bandwagon with China. As de-coupling intensifies, joining BRICS provides Malaysia with more options and partnerships to de-risk rather than developing reliance on China.

As the 2025 ASEAN chair, Malaysia can use BRICS as a platform to bring ASEAN’s voice to a wider global south community. Anwar’s book The Asian Renaissance envisioned an Asia-style global order with fairness and justice, with diversity and inclusiveness, one which was supposed to be different from a Western order. If BRICS has the potential to challenge the current Western-led global order, Malaysia certainly wants to be part of it to influence the discourse and direction of a revised order. Instead of weakening ASEAN centrality, Malaysia needs to leverage ASEAN as a collective grouping to obtain a more powerful voice in BRICS.

Third, joining BRICS is part of Malaysia’s hedging strategy. It signals Putrajaya’s discontent over US commitment to the region and serves as leverage to demand more effort from the US and its allies. Since assuming power in November 2022, Anwar has paid an official visit to China but has yet to make an official trip to the US, despite attending UN and APEC meetings there. Part of this reflects growing domestic anti-US sentiment in Malaysia, but another part shows Malaysia’s response to what the US has offered. Washington’s absence from the 43rd ASEAN Annual Summit disappointed many ASEAN states. Its reluctance to join CPTPP and failure to provide meaningful market access through IPEF are also seen as lacking commitment. Consequently, Malaysia’s announcement and Thailand’s earlier bid to join BRICS are signals to the US to reassess its Southeast Asia strategy.

Nevertheless, how much Malaysia can benefit from BRICS and manage others’ perceptions of departing from its non-aligned strategy remains to be seen. It matters how this move fits into the longer-term planning of Malaysia’s development strategies. Economically, Malaysia needs to attract quality investment and advance in the global value chain. BRICS countries can be valuable investment partners, but they are unlikely to replace the US and EU as the country’s main sources of FDI.

Additionally, perceptions matter. Though avoiding being trapped in binary great-power rivalry narratives, Malaysia still faces challenges. By dint of association, Malaysia being part of BRICS would amplify perceptions that the grouping is perceived as a vehicle for China and Russia to counter the US and the Group of 7. Indonesia decided to stay out of BRICS precisely because it does not want to be perceived as taking a side. For Malaysia, navigating these perceptions and communicating its non-aligned stance to ASEAN members and others is vital.

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