Will Iran Withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? - War ...
The longstanding shadow conflict between Iran and Israel has entered a new, more dangerous phase of open confrontation. For decades, both nations engaged in covert operations and proxy warfare in what was known as the “campaign between wars.” Hamas’ devastating attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, upended this dynamic. In subsequent months, Israel assassinated several key figures in the Axis of Resistance — Iran’s network of non-state allies and proxies — as well as senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders. In response, Iran launched two direct missile barrages against Israeli military targets in April 2024 and October 2024, an unprecedented escalation. And whereas Israel responded with a limited strike on an Iranian air defense system near Natanz in April, the Israeli retaliation on Oct. 26 targeted the majority of Iranian air defenses and facilities for Iranian missile production. These exchanges have brought the conflict between Iran and Israel out of the shadows.
The tit-for-tat exchanges and weakening of Tehran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, paired with Iran’s rapid expansion of its nuclear program, increases the odds that Iran will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This act — related to yet distinct from the broader question of an Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons — would further escalate the crisis and likely spell disaster for efforts to constrain Iran’s program. While not the dominant theory in policy-making circles for how the Iran nuclear crisis might unfold, withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a significant lever for Tehran to create a “mini-crisis” without committing to full escalation. By threatening or pursuing withdrawal, Iran could intensify diplomatic pressure and signal frustration, testing international response thresholds while sidestepping the high-stakes consequences of weaponization. An Iranian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty withdrawal would also deal a serious — and potentially unrecoverable — blow to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The United States, in concert with a coalition of key states, should undertake efforts to reduce escalation risks in the ongoing conflict and shape Iran’s cost-benefit calculus to prevent this outcome. First, the immediate priority should be reducing tensions between Iran and Israel, including by dissuading Israeli actions against Iranian nuclear facilities and simultaneously pressuring Iran to adopt nuclear stopgap measures to prevent weaponization while diplomatic solutions are pursued. Second, the United States should work with both Western powers and states with ties to Iran to convince Iran that the diplomatic and security costs of withdrawal outweigh any potential benefits. Finally, this coalition of states ought to develop specific diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks for the critical three-month notice period should Iran invoke the withdrawal clause of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The State of Affairs
In April 2024, Iran launched its first-ever direct attack on Israel from its territory in response to Israeli assassinations of high-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and strikes on Iran’s Damascus consulate. Israel’s retaliation to the missile attack was measured, in the form of a strike against an air defense system in Esfahan. Although the April episode ended there, this unprecedented exchange made clear that Iran had failed to effectively constrain Israel’s actions against its Axis of Resistance. Since April, the conflict has continued to escalate with Israel’s assassination of key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and the leadership of the Axis of Resistance, including Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, culminating (for now) in Iran’s second direct attack on Israel on Oct. 1 and Israel’s retaliatory attack on Oct. 26.
Throughout October, as Israel prepared its response to Iran’s missile barrage, speculation grew over whether Israel’s targets would include Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. Numerous Israeli officials openly considered targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. In an op-ed for the New York Times, for example, Israeli Minister of Defense Benny Gantz called for removing the threat of a nuclear Iran “should that clear red line be crossed.” Yet, arguably due to pressure from the United States, Israel redirected its focus toward Iranian military sites.
The majority of Israeli strikes were on air defense systems and missile-related targets. However, the Israeli Air Force also conducted a “symbolic” strike on a site in Parchin, a site associated with past nuclear weapons research and development. Though Israel refrained from targeting nuclear facilities, the potential damage to Iranian air defenses and setbacks in missile production likely make Iran much more vulnerable to any future retaliation — including attacks to obstruct its nuclear program.
The possibility of Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, alongside Israel’s ongoing efforts to weaken Iran’s regional proxies, has occurred against the backdrop of the rapid expansion of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is now a threshold nuclear state. It possesses a growing stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, and the technical expertise necessary for weaponization, placing it closer than ever to becoming a nuclear-armed state even without having taken the final step toward weaponization. The potential to leverage this capability as a deterrent against Israeli aggression has undoubtedly been a point of consideration for Iranian decision-makers in informing their behavior in this cycle of escalation.
U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence assessments have consistently emphasized that Iran’s nuclear decision-making hinges primarily on political calculations rather than technical milestones. Moreover, Iranian leadership has traditionally compartmentalized its nuclear program and its regional strategy of asymmetric warfare through proxies and militias. However, the recent exchanges suggest this compartmentalization may be breaking down, as Iran’s conventional military vulnerabilities become more apparent. It is not surprising, then, that over the past year, Iranian officials have hinted at revising their nuclear doctrine, moving from general posturing to more concrete proposals to bolster their security — including the possibility of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iran and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Like all members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran retains the sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty should it decide that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of [the] country.” Iran could invoke this Article X right to withdraw by submitting a required three months’ notice to all treaty members and the U.N. Security Council.
Iran has explored the possibility of withdrawal in the past, most notably during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency from 2005 to 2013 and after the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. While never implemented, these gambits were largely tactical, aimed at using the threat of withdrawal as diplomatic leverage to counter U.N. Security Council sanctions or protest U.S. unilateralism.
Today’s discourse in Tehran sounds fundamentally different, with the stakes at an all-time high. Iran’s broader security interests are crumbling as it simultaneously edges closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons are now regularly discussed as imperatives for Iran’s national security. For instance, in anticipation of Israel’s retaliation for Iran’s Oct. 1 attack, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, referenced withdrawal in remarks about how integral Iran’s nuclear facilities are to the country, highlighting in particular the three-month “window for negotiations” should Iran decide to withdraw. Additionally, a member of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, stated: “Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially within Parliament and among the representatives of the nation, is considered a serious idea in defense of the national interests of the country.” Notably, though, Boroujerdi went on to clarify that withdrawal would not necessarily mean that Iran intends to produce or develop nuclear weapons — a caveat that emphasizes a decision to withdraw could be distinct and made separately from a decision to build the bomb.
Even if not accompanied by a decision to build the bomb, Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a clear abrogation of its nonproliferation commitments and would complicate the international community’s legal basis for enforcing those commitments. Moreover, withdrawal would almost certainly mean the end of Iran’s already fraught cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Should agency inspectors be ejected, that would not only entirely remove the international community’s eyes and ears on Tehran’s program, but could also significantly increase escalation risks — without any reliable indication of the status of the program, states may make worst-case assumptions about Iranian actions and take preemptive measures to thwart what they may interpret as an Iranian sprint to the bomb. Even short of this risk, Iran’s withdrawal from the treaty could create a climate more conducive to open discussions about military responses — especially within the U.S. Congress, where such a step could be seen as grounds for authorizing force.
In the long term, Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could initiate a cascade of withdrawals and, in a worst-case scenario, a proliferation domino, fundamentally undermining the nonproliferation regime and threatening international peace and security. Withdrawal threatens longer-term, systemic consequences by eroding the credibility of and confidence in the regime’s ability to constrain proliferation, which could encourage other states to abandon their treaty commitments without necessarily weaponizing. Moreover, if accompanied by a decision to develop a nuclear weapon, Iran’s withdrawal could provide an incentive for its rivals to accelerate their own nuclear programs. It could thus precipitate a dangerous future for the Middle East: two (or more) hostile nuclear-armed states outside of the treaty.
Whither Withdrawal?
Numerous developments in the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict could lead Iran to threaten to or actually withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A direct, kinetic attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is perhaps the most likely catalyst. Several prominent Iranian figures have said as much, declaring that if Israel targets Tehran’s nuclear sites, Iran will abandon the treaty and declare itself a nuclear state.
An Israeli attack on nuclear facilities would elevate the perceived existential threat to Iran. Iranian leadership would likely view such an attack as a fundamental breach of its sovereignty and an immediate danger to national security. Threatening to withdraw — and not necessarily to develop the bomb — could serve multiple purposes. Primarily, the mere threat of withdrawal could compel the United States and other international actors to intervene and restrain further Israeli aggression. Tehran might also calculate that the specter of an unrestrained and unmonitored nuclear program could serve as a deterrent against future attacks.
Tehran might also consider withdrawal as an escalation, but one unlikely to trigger as severe of a response as a decision to develop the bomb. Iran could frame this action as a defensive measure and a legitimate response to perceived violations of its rights under Article IV, which guarantees access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Tehran might argue that other treaty member states have failed to protect Iran’s sovereign right to develop peaceful nuclear technology, particularly in the face of aggression from Israel — a nation with an undeclared nuclear arsenal.
But an Iranian decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may not necessarily be contingent on a direct kinetic strike against its nuclear infrastructure. Withdrawal could be used as a retaliatory measure in a future conflict or as leverage to prevent such a conflict from occurring. For example, Iranian policy-makers might preemptively threaten to exit the treaty as a way to deter further Israeli aggression, signaling that any continuation of Israeli hostilities — whether or not nuclear sites are directly targeted — would lead to a formal withdrawal.
Ongoing tensions with Israel could also indirectly lead to an Iranian withdrawal. If continued developments push Tehran to make additional technical or political advancements toward a nuclear weapons capability, the European 3 — France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — could decide to trigger the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025. This process would reimpose all prior U.N. sanctions on Iran, further isolating the country economically and diplomatically. Iran may threaten to withdraw from the treaty to pressure the European 3 not to trigger the snapback process. If it fails, Iran may invoke Article X with an aim to use the three-month notice period as a negotiation tactic to demand concessions and assurances, such as sanctions relief or security guarantees, in exchange for rescinding its notice of withdrawal. In this context, the prospect of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty withdrawal could serve as a bargaining chip, designed to fracture the international sanctions coalition and force a diplomatic compromise that alleviates pressure on Iran while allowing it to preserve its nuclear advancements.
In the long term, the cycle of retaliation between Iran and Israel could drive Iran to reevaluate the value of the treaty altogether. Tehran may increasingly see its adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and commitment to nonproliferation as more of a liability than an advantage if Israel’s actions continue to erode Iran’s network of regional proxies and its nuclear program remains under attack through cyber operations, covert sabotage, and the assassination of scientists. In this scenario, the decision to withdraw would not be driven by a singular event, but rather by an accumulation of provocations and threats that Tehran perceives as systematically undermining its security. In essence, the deterrence value Iran has possessed because of the threshold capability may no longer outweigh the putative costs of a decision to cross the line and weaponize.
Preventing Iranian Withdrawal
Understanding Iranian discourse, particularly in the context of its ongoing conflict with Israel, is crucial to assessing the potential short-term and long-term damage posed by Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This discourse provides critical insight into potential Iranian logic behind a decision to withdraw and highlights a lack of consideration of the severe risks of such a decision. Withdrawal would very likely lead Iran to reject international oversight on its nuclear program, which it might frame as a response to external threats rather than an immediate step toward weaponization. However, without oversight and monitoring, Iran’s actions would likely trigger worst-case assumptions, spurring responses ranging from further diplomatic and economic sanctions to preemptive strikes. These potential outcomes make it clear that the United States and the international community as a whole have a vested interest in not only preventing Iran from withdrawing from the treaty but also elucidating these risks to Iran.
As such, numerous measures should be employed to prevent Iranian withdrawal. First, the United States and its Western partners should dissuade Israel from targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and should undertake additional efforts to reduce tensions and continued escalation in the regional conflict. Any military strike against Iranian nuclear installations is extremely unlikely to destroy the entire program or set it back for more than a few years — let alone eliminate the irreversible knowledge gains Iran has achieved in the last few years. But, as indicated, it could push Tehran toward withdrawal. Efforts to dissuade Israel from such counterproductive measures should be accompanied by simultaneous efforts to pressure Iran to adopt nuclear stopgap and stabilization measures as part of a larger endeavor aimed at reducing tensions in the region and negotiating a nuclear off-ramp to the broader Iranian nuclear problem. For instance, this could involve Iran refraining from uranium enrichment beyond 60 percent, halting any weaponization-related research, and both sides abstaining from military escalation.
Beyond trying to shape developments in the ongoing conflict, the United States and the European 3 should garner a coalition of states to counter pro-withdrawal narratives in Iran by expounding how the costs of withdrawing would outweigh the benefits. While Russia is unlikely to play a significant role in such a coalition, China may see value in participating in a collective effort to preserve and reinforce nonproliferation norms more broadly. Outside of these traditional players, the coalition should also include states with ties to Iran and a significant stake in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, such as Brazil, Japan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates.
To be most effective, this coalition of the concerned should adopt a two-pronged strategy aimed at countering the diplomatic and security arguments in favor of withdrawal. For the first prong, the coalition should make clear that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would isolate Iran on the global stage. In other words, convey that rather than being a bargaining chip for Tehran, such a move would simply galvanize international action and provide legal and diplomatic grounds for enhanced multilateral pressure. The coalition should strengthen measures to ensure that Tehran would be held accountable under international law for any violations of the treaty it undertook prior to withdrawing, including by preparing legal arguments to demonstrate how Iran’s own rhetoric around its technical capacity to build the bomb undercuts its persistent argument that the program is intended solely for peaceful purposes. These efforts would serve to undermine any Iranian attempt to legitimize its withdrawal on the premise that its Article IV rights had been violated and, importantly, weaken its appeal to states that may be sympathetic to arguments about disparities in the nonproliferation regime.
For the second prong, the coalition should make clear that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would not advance Iran’s security interests but, rather, would make Iran more vulnerable to attack. As discussed, withdrawal would almost certainly eliminate Iran’s safeguards agreements. This lack of international oversight over Iran’s nuclear program, in turn, could fuel worst-case assumptions about the program, raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation that could lead to military strikes on Iranian territory. Iran would instead benefit from staying in the treaty regime and cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency so that the international community remains confident that the program is not being weaponized.
Finally, in case Iran invokes Article X, the coalition of key states should use the three-month notice period urgently and prudently to convince Iran to change course. The coalition can leverage the inherent urgency of the three-month period to pressure Iran to come to the negotiation table and to simultaneously garner greater international support to pressure Iran not to proceed any further. Critically, any negotiation should be contingent on Iran’s recommitment to the treaty, require Iran to restore rigorous international monitoring of its nuclear program, and include clearly delineated provisions alongside any concessions or assurances to prevent abuse.
The specter of an Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty looms large over an already volatile Middle East. Such a move would not only unshackle Tehran’s nuclear ambitions but could also trigger a domino effect, unraveling decades of nonproliferation efforts.
Of course, the threat of withdrawal and even the invocation of Article X would not necessarily equate to immediate weaponization. Iran may view leaving the treaty as a useful strategy for gaining leverage or responding to perceived threats, rather than as a definitive step toward nuclear armament. Paradoxically, though, withdrawal could make Iran more vulnerable, even if it harbors no immediate intentions to develop nuclear weapons. The absence of international oversight that would accompany its withdrawal could fuel worst-case assumptions about Iran’s program, potentially increasing the risk of preemptive strikes or more severe sanctions.
Given the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel, combined with the growing calls for withdrawal within Iran, the United States and a broader coalition of concerned states would be prudent to anticipate Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and do their best to prevent it.
Jamie Kwong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on nonproliferation issues, the Korean Peninsula, and multilateral regimes, including the P5 Process and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Nicole Grajewski is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research examines Russian-Iranian relations, Iran’s nuclear program, and Russian nuclear strategy.
Image: Hamed Malekpour via Wikimedia Commons
