Mapping scenarios for future Russia-Kazakhstan relations

“The Kazakhs never had any statehood.” – Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2014)

“Our independence is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to protect it.” – Nursultan Nazarbayev, former President of Kazakhstan (2014)

The relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan has been largely stable. Yet under the surface, significant developments have occurred in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhstan, once perceived as an informal extension of Russia, has experienced changes such as a notable rise in anti-imperialist sentiment, active engagement in nation-building efforts, and the distancing of the authorities in Astana from supporting the war. In the following analysis, we explore the future of Russia-Kazakhstan relations by examining potential shifts in Russia’s domestic politics and cross-referencing these scenarios with potential developments in bilateral affairs. As a result, we present 12 scenarios that outline the range of possibilities. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that given the unpredictable nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine, future Russian-Kazakh relations could easily go either way.

Context of Russia’s war against Ukraine

Kazakhstan has been greatly affected since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by growing calls for decolonization and de-Russification. Two major implications can be identified here:

Kazakh society has actively sought to accelerate ongoing nation-building processes amid a notable rise in anti-imperialist sentiment. Kazakh authorities have refused to back the

This stance has prompted Russian officials, like the Moscow city parliament Deputy Sergey Savostyanov, to call for including Kazakhstan in a false narrative of a “demilitarization and denazification zone” to protect Russia’s security interests. A commentator on regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s daily show even declared that “the next problem [after Ukraine] is Kazakhstan.” While not part of the mainstream Russian narrative, these discourses show the potential for either covert or overt aggression from a revanchist, irredentist Russia that could develop regarding Kazakhstan in the future. This outcome is grounded and based on the war in Ukraine, which will alter Russia’s military and economic capabilities, as well as its domestic political situation.

Setting the framework

Below, we explain the different scenarios that could happen in Russia’s domestic politics:

Democratization (The Gorbachev story): A leader in Russia emerges who, like Gorbachev, tries to reform and modernize Russia. In this scenario, Russia ends its war against Ukraine; transitions back to a civilian economy; strengthens its democratic institutions; and redevelops relations with the West. Autocratization (The Putin story): The status-quo remains with Putin in power. Russia experiences increasing repression and totalitarianism. The economy continues to militarize; the gradual socialization of youth within this context takes place through the education system; and the war in Ukraine continues. Radicalization (The Prigozhin story): A radical right-wing fascist group takes power in Moscow. A long war; lack of military progress; economic sanctions; and tens of thousands of Russian dead soldiers lead to an even more openly pro-war faction coming to power. Time of troubles (The Yeltsin story): Russia is gripped by increasing domestic political uncertainty. The Russian political elite succumbs to factional infighting; civil unrest breaks out in major cities; or peripheral regions inhabited by ethnic minorities become Overall, Russian politics is dominated by domestic concerns and the country is unable to exert or defend its perceived interests abroad.

Next, we explain the scenarios related to external geopolitical developments between Russia and Kazakhstan:

Multi-vectorism: Russia and Kazakhstan maintain constructive relations. Kazakhstan engages with China to increase investments in the country while Russia maintains its cultural and military dominance in the region. Engagement between Kazakhstan and the West is limited compared to that of Russia and China. Russkiy Mir expands: An emboldened Russia, possibly following a victory or favorable negotiated settlement in Ukraine, expands its military presence in Central Asia and heightens tensions with NATO member states. Moscow is silent: Similar to the twilight years of the Soviet Union, Russia does not have the capacity or the political will to maintain its influence abroad or promote its power through economic and military means.

Scenarios

1.Democratization – Multi-vectorism

After a full military defeat following its full-scale invasion, the Kremlin also loses the fight with a democratic domestic competitor. Kazakhstan, sensing a diminished threat from Russia, fully embraces its policy of “Kazakhstanization” by utilizing the time to strengthen its sovereignty and become a more independent country. Therefore, it continues with its multi-vector policy without limiting itself to several options, resulting in maximized benefit. Russia acknowledges that a broader network of allies will strengthen its geopolitical standing, as well as its drastically weakened economy after the war, so it tries to strengthen its relations with Kazakhstan.

Democratization – Russkiy Mir expands

After Russia’s full military defeat in Ukraine, Kazakhstan senses a diminished threat from Russia and eases its policy of “Kazakhstanization”. It strategically leverages the influx of Russian businesses to bolster its economy. Kazakhstan intensifies its bilateral relations with Russia, already being a top trading partner and accounting for a fifth of Kazakhstan’s total external trade, without seeking to diversify its foreign policy. Russia, in turn, welcomes this economic partnership, viewing a strong Kazakhstan as an ally that can help compensate for the resources lost during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This also offers Moscow a counterbalance to its dependence on China.

Democratization – Moscow is silent

In the wake of its defeat in Ukraine, Russia undergoes a democratization process. However, the country’s diminished resources and geopolitical influence make it less appealing for Kazakhstan. Consequently, Kazakhstan strategically shifts its focus away completely from Russia and redirects its resources in order to strengthen relations with China, Turkey, and the West.

Autocratization – Multi-vectorism

The war in Ukraine becomes a simmering, frozen conflict. Russia’s economy is overheated but stable, being able to mostly weather western sanctions. Russia continues balancing relations with Kazakhstan, allowing Kazakh multi-vectorism by accepting its limited capacity to help Kazakhstan prosper economically while still maintaining a dominant cultural and military role in the region. Russia tacitly allows increased Chinese economic influence as it forges closer ties with Beijing to counter the West. At the same time, Russia and Kazakhstan still depend on one another economically, with Astana playing an important role in allowing Russia to bypass western sanctions. In the short to medium term (one to five years), we judge this to be the most likely scenario.

Autocratization – Russkiy Mir expands

The West stops aiding Ukraine. Russia is winning the war and a Chinese-sponsored “peace deal” is agreed. Russia freezes the conflict in order to rest and rebuild. Western sanctions ease and its economy starts growing again. However, the country is still highly militarized. Russia takes this opportunity to build its Eurasian project, integrating Kazakhstan and other states in the region through the Eurasian Economic Union. In response to growing Kazakh nationalism, a still revanchist Kremlin sponsors pro-Russian groups in northern Kazakhstan under the pretext of protecting Russian speakers. While we do not judge this to be the most likely scenario, it could still happen. A Trump victory in the 2024 US election may lead to a more isolationist United States that withdraws from Europe and stops supporting Ukraine. In this case, a scenario like this becomes possible.

Autocratization – Moscow is silent

Russia is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine and severe economic troubles at home. National Kazakh identity strengthens through the promotion of policies concerning Kazakh language, culture, and history. China, Turkey, the Gulf states and Western states increase cooperation with Kazakhstan. Astana diversifies away from Russian energy dependence over time. Kazakhstan agrees to a deal with China to build a trans-Caspian pipeline that bypasses Russia. Moscow cannot interfere, neglecting the Central Asian region in favour of focusing on Ukraine and dealing with problems at home. In the long term (ten years and more), we judge this to be the most possible scenario.

Radicalization – Multi-vectorism

If the war in Ukraine continues and Russia keeps losing blood and treasure on the battlefield, there is a possibility that more reactionary forces will take power. Even though it would mostly be focused on Ukraine, this new regime would try to bring Kazakhstan closer to its sphere of influence. Moscow would start more steadily using the carrot-and-stick approach. The previous interruptions to oil flows or restrictions of operations that affected the Caspian Pipeline Consortium would be the new norm. There could be a more aggressive propaganda campaign to promote separatism among Russians in northern Kazakhstan. Annexing territory and a full-scale invasion cannot be ruled out in the long term.

Radicalization – Russkiy Mir expands

In this scenario, Russia gains military and economic control over Kazakhstan. The new fascist government in Moscow would take advantage of its neighbour by trying to gain control over its foreign trade and resources. This would impact the Russian economy and lead to strong militarization. Establishing a puppet government would be the second step, followed by Russification policies and the imposition of strict controls on expressions of Kazakh culture. Even though the Russian regime would have control of most of Kazakhstan, it could also try to annex northern parts of the country.

Radicalization – Moscow is silent

This is a scenario in which Russia is isolated, distant, and lacks the capabilities to project its power. No matter the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia would find itself in a weaker political and economic situation. It would not have the capacity to intervene in Kazakhstan. However, a new fascist regime, desperate to get control and regain power as a major geopolitical actor, would scare Kazakhstan, which would try to get closer to others for protection like China, the EU, or the US. The new regime in Moscow may also try to overthrow the Kazakh government by promoting separatism and using cyber-attacks, closing the border, and expelling the Kazakh population from Russia. Any answer by the Kazakh government would be used as an excuse, but an invasion and large-scale attacks would not happen immediately, considering Russia’s weakness.

Time of troubles – Multi-vectorism

Given an increasingly unstable and possibly more unpredictable Russia, Kazakhstan could develop ties with other regional states to balance the possible new threats emanating from Russia. However, Kazakhstan would continue to maintain close ties with the Kremlin to prevent any hostile Russian reaction.

Time of troubles – Russkiy Mir expands

An over-extended Russia might try to increase cooperation with Kazakhstan to secure its long southern border against drug smuggling and illegal migration. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that an unstable and weakened Russia would be able to deepen its existing ties with Kazakhstan, especially given Astana’s increasing hesitancy regarding Russian-led integration projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union.

Time of troubles – Moscow is silent

If Russia’s capacity to project its geopolitical influence and economic clout abroad is significantly weakened, then Kazakhstan could use this opportunity to deepen ties with other regional powers. Kazakhstan will likely hedge its bets against an unstable Russia by increasing economic and military ties with EU, US, and China. At the same time, it would assert its independence by promoting national Kazakh policies domestically.

Black Swan events

Any major unpredictable and sudden event could change these scenarios. A coup d’etat in Russia or Kazakhstan could lead to a radical change in local politics and affect Russian capabilities. Even though it is possible that a new democratic government would arise after this, it is unlikely. The new regime might be more aggressive and thus the possibility of further aggression may increase. Instability in Russia also might make Kazakhstan act more boldly on its intentions to develop closer ties with other countries like the US, China, and Turkey. Other possible events that could change the presented scenarios would occur in Central Asia or Kazakhstan itself. A sudden regime change in Astana could lead to a major transformation. A new government might be extremely pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, or it might try to build closer relations with the EU and the United States.

Conclusion

Overall, our analysis concludes that the most likely scenario in the short to medium term is further autocratization in Russia under Putin’s regime, with Kazakhstan maintaining a multi-vector foreign policy. In the long term, the most likely scenario shifts to Russia losing influence over Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region to growing economic, security, and cultural ties with China. Kazakhstan will hedge its bets against a revanchist Russia by forming closer ties with Beijing, as well as with the EU, US, and Turkey. However, given the unpredictable nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the outcome of the upcoming US election, and the prospect of transformational black swan events, other scenarios are also possible. One of them is the possibility of a strengthened Russo-Chinese quasi-alliance should the US and EU decrease support for Ukraine. In this scenario, Russia has a high chance of achieving its objective of controlling Ukraine, while China is more likely to become emboldened to act aggressively in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the future of bilateral relations between Russia and Kazakhstan is dependent as much on external as on internal variables. Whichever way events unfold, academics and policymakers alike need to understand all possible scenarios to implement more effective policies, prevent the worst outcomes, and prepare for the future.

Mariam Bitchoshvili is a Project Assistant at the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). She is also an MA candidate, majoring in Central and East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Tartu and the University of Glasgow. Previously, she worked as a Program Associate at the United Nations Association of Georgia and as a Public Affairs Intern at the U.S. Embassy in Georgia.

Harry Fennell is currently pursuing a master’s degree in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (CEERES) at KIMEP, the University of Glasgow and the University of Tartu. He also works for Lossi 36, a student-led publication that publishes articles on Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Ignacio Hutin has a Licentiate in Journalism and MA in International Relations from Argentina. Currently he is an Advisory Councillor of the Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL) for Eastern Europe, Balkans and Eurasia, and is working for the online newspaper Infobae.

Zahar Hryniv is an MA student in European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow and the University of Tartu. He is also a student intern at the US Department of State and a Research Assistant at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. All views and opinions expressed are his own.

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Central Asia, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan, Russia, Russia-Central Asia relations, Russia-Kazakhstan relations, Russian influence, Vladimir Putin